Since its birth, modern Lebanon has on and off contemplated adopting neutrality as official state policy. Raymond Edde, a prominent Christian political leader and MP, repeatedly called during the 1960s and 1970s to adopt neutrality a la Switzerland, going so far as calling for UN troops to be stationed along the Lebanese borders with Syria and Israel. But neutrality was never really seriously considered in Lebanese political culture, especially by its Sunni Muslim community which wanted to remain committed to Arab causes in general and the Palestinian cause in particular, and in recent decades by its Shiite community with deepening ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Taking stock of the decline of Christian communities throughout the Middle East as a result of a resurgent radical Islam in recent decades, the Maronite Catholic Patriarch in Lebanon has been calling for the State of Lebanon to officially declare what he calls “positive” neutrality. The qualifier "positive" is to underscore that such a neutral Lebanon will be engaged and would not be isolationist. The objective is to shield the country and his community against Muslim centrifugal forces tearing the country between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. So far, the proposal has received tepid, if not hostile, reaction from leaders of the Muslim communities in Lebanon.
It is my opinion that Islam as a political ideology has not yet matured enough for the Patriarch’s call to have any chance at becoming reality. The Shiite community, led by pro-Iran Hezbollah and the pro-Syria Amal Movement, is too deeply anchored in its war rhetoric against Israel and also against the Sunnis at large. The Sunni community, being itself under siege from the Shiites, has made vague and lukewarm statements concerning the Patriarch’s call, because it too is deeply anchored in the notion of Lebanon’s “Arab” identity that it is unlikely to support neutrality. There is not one neutral Muslim or Arab country around the world today, and for the Muslims of Lebanon to acquiesce to neutrality seems a very remote possibility.
To answer the question of whether neutrality will be accepted by Lebanon’s Muslim communities, I have taken the liberty to publish abbreviated excerpts from a section (entitled “Neutrality in Islam”) of the paper “Neutrality and Constructivism” published in https://ebrary.net/233041/political_science/neutrality_constructivism
The conclusion of the paper is that Islam is not favorable to the idea of “permanent neutrality”, but might accept it temporarily for pragmatic reasons under certain circumstances.
Make sure to read the final two paragraphs below on "Small States" and "Permanent Neutrality Variables" because they appear as though they were written specifically for Lebanon, cornered as it has been between the two hostile countries of Israel and Syria.
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Excerpts from the paper:
Neutrality was looked upon as an irrelevant and even immoral concept in early Christian thought, particularly after the introduction of the Just War doctrine by Saint Augustine. The paper focuses on the feasibility and desirability of the permanent neutrality of Afghanistan (a conservative Muslim state surrounded by majority Muslim states, except China) and evaluates neutrality’s place in Islamic International Law and inter-state relations in Islam.
As signatories of the UN charter, Muslim states are subject to many rules of public international law. However, the heavy influence of Shariah law and the presence of powerful Islamist constituencies in majority Muslim states makes it imperative that grand policies either be compatible with, or at least not contradict, the teachings of Islam.
Islamic law research on neutrality is limited to the writings of a handful of Muslim scholars who have written on the subject of neutrality in the Islamic polity. Moreover, other scholars such as Efraim Karsh and David Brackett have also made references to Islam’s hostile attitude toward neutrality.
Hamidullah, one of the earliest writers to discuss neutrality specifically, offers a detailed account of the practice of neutrality, its nuances, and references to it found in traditional sources from the earlier Islamic period. He traces the practice of neutrality in the conduct of the city-state of Madina in relation to its neighboring non-Muslim tribes, the existence of neutral factions during the first internal war among the Muslim leadership (the First Fitna 656-661 AD), and finally the treaties of non-aggression between Muslim rulers and non-Muslim states and territories. Hamidullah quoted examples and passages from the Qur’an and Hadith to conclude that “the notion and the fact of neutrality were not unknown to early Muslims.”
While Hamidullah admits the under-developed status of neutrality within Islam and refrains from providing a definitive statement on the subject, Majid Khadduri, a prominent scholar of Islamic law, believes that in classical Islamic theory, there is no room for such a thing as a policy of neutrality. He argues that “if neutrality is taken to mean the attitude of a state which voluntarily desires to keep out of war by not taking sides, no such status is recognized in the Muslim legal theory. For Islam must ipso jure be at war with any state that refuses to come to terms with it either by submitting to Muslim rule or by accepting temporary peace agreement”.
Other scholars, like Abu Zahra and Zuhayli, take a more pragmatic approach. In the classical view, the world is divided into Dar Al-Islam (world of Islam) and Dar Al-Harb (world of war). According to this view, and based on the interpretation of verses within Chapter 9 (at-taubah) of the Qur’an, “[a]rmed Jihad is to be earned out until all lands are liberated from unbelievers and when all unbelievers submit to the rule of Islam”. However, Abu Zahra and Zuhayli challenge the classical dual division of the world into Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb. Abu Zahra suggests that there exists a middle ground between the two “worlds” or realms, and he calls it Dar Al-Hiyad (realm of neutrality), and refers to Verse 90 of Chapter 4 in the Qur’an, arguing “that the Qur’an allows the existence of third parties who neither want to fight the Muslims, nor are their enemy”.
Likewise, Zuhayli accepts the existence of the provision of neutrality in Islamic law on the ground that the dual division of the world into the realm of Islam and the realm of war is a purely pragmatic division influenced by the political situation of the time. He further argues, “Islam recognized what resembles the contemporary forms of neutrality as a political reality, if not as a juristic system, in a way comparable to its beginnings in Europe. There is, however, no obstacle in recognizing neutrality as a legal system”.
Non-Muslim scholars Efraim Karsh and David S. Brackett refer to a part of the last sentence of Verse 74, Chapter 4 of the Qur’an, which says that “Allah will afflict them with a painful doom in the world and the Hereafter, and they have no protecting friend nor helper in the earth” to argue that Islam detests neutrality and neutrals. The verse in fact discusses the events surrounding the Expedition of Tabuk in 630 AD. The word “them” in the verse specifically refers to a group of “hypocrites” who travelled along with Prophet Mohammed to Tabuk. Hypocrites, their deeds, and characters have been explored in detail in Chapter 63, Surat Al-Munafiqun (The Hypocrites), in the Qur’an. Karsh and Brackett do not distinguish between hypocrites and neutrals and argue that those whom Prophet Mohammed used to call hypocrites were in fact neutrals.
There seems to be a consensus among contemporary scholars about the recognition and practices of neutrality in the earlier Islamic period. However, whether it is permissible for an Islamic polity to adopt neutrality as its official state policy remains in question. For example, from a broader Sharia perspective, neutrality is not acceptable in case a war arises between a Muslim and a non-Muslim state, particularly when the aggression is initiated by the non-Muslim state… or when maintaining a neutral posture jeopardizes Muslim unity.
On the other hand, there is sufficient textual and historical evidence brought forth by modem scholars in support of the permissibility of some forms of neutrality in Islam, although not the permanent type. While this historical evidence points to the practice of temporary neutrality in the earlier Islamic period, the concept of neutrality under Islamic law has not been further developed into a separate legal and political system. One can conclude that Islam takes a pragmatic approach toward neutrality, condoning neutrality on a temporary basis when it is in the interest of a Muslim polity.
Scholars and policymakers have described permanent neutrality as a flexible instrument of statecraft, a remedy for removing the causes of war, a diplomatic technique to transform military stalemates into political stalemates, and finally, a by-product of the balance of power or a catalyst for strengthening it. According to Black, neutralization has three primary functions: (1) removing or insulating an area from active hostilities among the great powers; (2) preventing exacerbation of conflict in zones of great powers’ contention and rivalry; and (3) ending active conflict aided by external powers, particularly when neither side is capable of an outright victory.
Small States
In the context of the foreign and security policies of small states, permanent neutrality also offers a rational policy choice for small states to survive in a situation of anarchy by remaining detached from another’s war. If successfully upheld and preserved, neutrality could also function as a source of state identity and provide good offices for conflict mediation. In a nutshell, as an alternative to active conflict, permanent neutrality serves the interest of both the great powers concerned with the stability of the international system and the small states striving to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Permanent neutrality variables
Our conjecture is that a policy of permanent neutrality is applicable when a small and, usually, weak state is located in an area of competitive interest of two or more major states. This description teases out three main characteristics of a state suitable for neutralization:
1. Geography: Neutrals or candidate states are located in an area of major power conflict and usually act as a buffer or insulator.
2. Capabilities: Neutrals or candidate states are weak and small and not major players in international politics.
3. Stalemate: The surrounding states have competitive interests inside the neutral or candidate state, but a complete domination by any one state is not likely.
Neuhold has further expanded on neutrality conditions. He argues that there are at least five prerequisites for viable permanent neutrality, including:
1. Existence of a durable balance of power between/among the rival powers surrounding the neutral or candidate state
2. Low and manageable level of hostilities between/among the rival powers
3. Limited strategic importance of the neutral state. No great power would be ready to obtain control of the neutral state at a high price
4. Challenging geography and high cost of conquering and controlling the neutral state
5. Domestic stability, cohesion, and public support for permanent neutrality
This brief literature review leads us to the conclusion that neutrality is a multi-dimensional concept … While neo-realism is better at explaining neutrality as a foreign policy of small and weak states caught in geographical buffer zones, a constructivist approach offers a superior argument for the sustainability of neutrality in the post-Cold War era. Islamic international law also recognizes neutrality largely as a pragmatic policy option, which Muslim polities could adopt under certain circumstances.
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