What Now for a Defeated Hezbollah?

What Now for a Defeated Hezbollah?

(Translated from Arabic - Hazem Sagghiyeh in “Ash Sharq Al-Awsat”)
May 18, 2022

Through the recent parliamentary elections, both the old Lebanon and the new Lebanon have closed in on Hezbollah and its allies, most notably those of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun and Gebran Bassil.

The old Lebanon, i.e. the Lebanon of the religious sects, could not bear any longer the duality of weapons between Hezbollah and the legitimate armed forces of the country. This old Lebanon has placed the Lebanese Forces Party on a parity with the Aounists of the FPM and at the helm of Christian representation in Parliament; it also has voted for some Sunni diehards despite Saad Hariri's withdrawal from the race, and has maintained Walid Jumblatt at the helm of the Druze community. This transformation in the landscape has deprived Hezbollah of most of its allies from outside the Shiite community, thus reducing the pro-Iranian militia to its own size, just as it deprived it of many of its appendages in other communities, including the local appendages of the Syrian dictatorship next door.

The new Lebanon, i.e. the younger generation of Civil Society that emerged from the October 17, 2019 revolution, is keen on fighting against the standard fare of Lebanese governance, namely looting and corruption. It has proclaimed in no uncertain terms its awareness of the link between the system and its military protectors. Accordingly, it has brought to Parliament, for the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, a respectable parliamentary bloc that may be able to develop new concepts and usher in heretofore unfamiliar mechanisms in the country's politics.

Those incoming young women and men were victims of Hezbollah’s repression when they challenged the looting and corruption regime in 2019, before they were targeted by Hezbollah’s media and spokespersons in a campaign of calumny, and accusations of treason and affiliation with the “embassies” (a euphemism for a purported role as agents of US and European “enemies” of Lebanon).

When measured against this rising generation of modern politicians who symbolize a new Lebanon, Hezbollah’s “Resistance” appears like a thing from an ugly and dull past, something really ancient, while also being the subject of a political embargo imposed by the old traditional establishment as well.

A striking similarity between Lebanon and Iraq cannot be ignored: The old Iraq, the Iraq of the religious sects and ethnic groups, is fighting Iranian influence through the Sunni and Kurdish blocs, while the new Iraq, the young Iraq, is fighting this influence and its proxies through a civil revolution launched three years ago by modernists and secular-minded progressives in the Shiite community itself.

But let us not be complacent in thinking that Hezbollah will “understand” the rejection by the new majority in Parliament of Hezbollah’s weapons and regime; let us not be naive in imagining that Hezbollah will comply with whatever decisions and resolutions the new Parliament will issue. Hezbollah's nature leads one to profoundly doubt that it will submit to the will of the people, expressed as it is by the election results.

It is true that Hezbollah's leadership, including its Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General, has more than once emphasized the importance of these elections and the need to abide by their results. Yet, one suspects that these assertions were mere placeholders to be used in case of Hezbollah’s victory in the elections. But in case of its defeat, which is what happened, there are opposite assertions ready to be used: those who won are, according to some other Hezbollah figures, conspirators backed by foreign embassies and non-governmental organizations and their deep pockets; they are “shields” protecting the eternal enemy Israel and seeking to normalize with it; they are fueling a civil war. Naturally, Hezbollah cannot hand the country over to these people.

It was constantly evident that Hezbollah tended to militarize political life in Lebanon, especially the elections. Standing against the practice and language of democracy, Hezbollah has mobilized a language of triumphalism and subjugation, of martyrs and martyrdom, not to forget the blind worship of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

More dangerous than all of that are the mobilization warnings embedded in Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches preceding the elections, particularly the insistence on exploring for oil along the southern Lebanese coast. According to Nasrallah, the Lebanese own a “treasure” they do not dare exploit out of fear of the Israelis and the Americans. But the “Resistance” is on standby, all ready and prepared to protect any courageous oil and gas exploration operation like this.

This narrative is amenable to be put militarily in practice at any moment with a populist message: Hezbollah is promising the Lebanese, who are reeling under poverty and misery, that this so-called “treasure” would fill their lives with prosperity and abundance.

It would not be surprising if Hezbollah were to resort to a military adventure of some sort, taking oil and gas exploration as a launching platform, to turn attention away from the election results, precisely as it did when it kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and conjured up the July 2006 war to undermine the ascending sovereignist agenda spawned by the 2005 political assassinations.

Such a possibility could accompany the political, and perhaps security, tensions which may haunt the new parliament for the foreseeable future as it confronts its upcoming milestones: The election of a Speaker, the appointment of a Prime Minister, the formation of a new government, and finally the election of a new President. Tensions that will be exacerbated by a move on the part of Hezbollah's opponents, both old and new, to establish a front coalescing and coordinating their efforts.

Hence, it is not unlikely that Hezbollah will, once again, punish the Lebanese for what they have accomplished in the elections, supposedly to protect them or promote their welfare. We know from all the past experiences that the bank of Hezbollah's sublime objectives - that hide not-so-sublime activities - is no better than the banks that have confiscated the savings of the Lebanese people.